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It’s “COMPETITION As a Discovery Procedure”

Here’s another letter to my long-time protectionist ‘friend.’

Mr. McKinney:

Calling my latest reply to Michael Brendan Dougherty “an example of knee jerk globalism,” you advise me to think more “creatively.” Specifically, you believe that Mr. Dougherty correctly invokes Hayek to support the protectionist argument that tariffs, if kept in place long enough, would, in your words, “give our firms enough breathing room, resources and motivation to grow their efficiencies.”

With respect, your claim defies credibility. When you encounter bad service from a restaurant, from an auto-repair shop, from a dry cleaner, or from some other merchant, do you continue to patronize that merchant? Are you unhappy that you have alternatives to this merchant? Do you think to yourself, ‘If only this merchant had fewer competitors, his service would improve’? Do you volunteer to pay higher prices to this merchant in exchange for his bad service in the belief that doing so will give him “breathing room, resources, and motivation” to improve his service? Or do you take your business elsewhere?

Tariffs reduce the competitive pressure on firms, which is to say that tariffs weaken firms’ incentives to please their customers. In short, tariffs create monopoly power.

The title of the Hayek article that Mr. Dougherty bizarrely cites in support of tariffs is “Competition as a Discovery Procedure,” not – as Mr. Dougherty and you seem to think – “Monopoly as a Discovery Procedure.”

Sincerely,
Don

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Some Links

Zachary Karabell warns of the dangers of AI fear-mongering. A slice:

The point isn’t that AI is without its existential risks. It is that the future here is, as futures are, unknown, and the decisions made today will shape what happens next. If false certainty of impending doom determines those actions, the ability of this new technology to help solve core human challenges — such as disease, climate change, population decline and the nature of work — will be constrained.

There is a past lesson in how nuclear power was managed in most countries. Because nuclear weapons threaten human existence and nuclear power plant accidents can be catastrophic, the nuclear regulatory framework was constructed primarily to mitigate harm. That may have helped prevent nuclear war, but it also constrained the deployment of and innovation in nuclear energy, which is both cleaner and cheaper than oil and gas. Cultural fear created a deep animus that never dissipated.

John Puri ponders the Declaration of Independence. A slice:

In John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, from which Thomas Jefferson took obvious inspiration, a natural law of justice exists before any government is instituted. In a precursor to the Declaration’s retelling, men exist in a state of nature with equal rights to life, liberty (or self-direction), and property acquired through exertion. Each person may exercise these rights freely, but only within the bounds of others’ rights. When one man violates the rights of another — by harming him, enslaving him, or stealing from him — he enters an unjust state of war, and his victim has the right to uphold the natural law by punishing his aggression.

John Ellis argues that “socialists have started winning because young voters were indoctrinated rather than educated.” A slice:

But as we contemplate academia’s degradation of the electorate, we must not forget the rest of the far-reaching damage it does. Education departments that instill poisonous ideologies in schoolteachers have depressed children’s test scores in reading and math to historic lows. Journalism, law and medical schools put woke indoctrination ahead of competent professional training.

The Washington Post‘s Editorial Board explains that “privatized air traffic control would mean safer skies.” A slice:

The FAA should be the regulator of air safety, just as the Federal Railroad Administration is the regulator of rail safety and the Federal Highway Administration and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration regulate road safety. The FAA should not own or operate the systems it regulates. Imagine if the FHA, which sets standards for traffic lights, also operated all of them nationwide, and that replacing any of the lights required asking Congress for money. Nobody would think that was an arrangement for safer streets.

So long as air traffic control remains within the FAA, the agency will be unaccountable and subject to the whims of politicians. Spinning off ATC, as 98 countries have done successfully for decades, would be good for taxpayers and, most importantly, for passenger safety.

Ramesh Ponnuru offers the following from the Department of Things Not to Worry About:

The Atlantic has an article by Jean Chatzky arguing that senior citizens are too cautious about spending money, which is bad both for themselves and for the economy. The concern about the negative effect of oversaving on an economy goes back to Keynes — but even Keynes was concerned about it only in the context of a zero-interest-rate economy. He was wrong, but we’re obviously not in that situation today.

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Quotation of the Day…

… is from page 198 of Samuel Gregg’s hot-off-the-press book, The Civilization of Commerce [original emphasis]:

Part of the stadial theory of development advanced by Scottish Enlighteners involved stressing that key institutions of commercial society had developed largely without conscious planning by governments. But the Scots were equally insistent that it is through our free choices to defer to the wisdom contained in particular institutions that we become free and can participate as citizens in commercial civilization.

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A Response to Michael Brendan Dougherty

Here’s a letter to National Review.

Editor:

Michael Brendan Dougherty accuses me of dancing around his core defense of tariffs (“On the Origin of Straw Men,” October 18). He protests that all he meant to say about tariffs is that they can – through a Hayekian discovery process – cause protected domestic industries to lower their costs below pre-tariff levels. I concede that this outcome is imaginable. But it’s imaginable only in the way that one can imagine a person surviving a free fall off of the top of a skyscraper by landing just right in a gigantic drift of downy snow.

First, Mr. Dougherty denies that he had in mind the most obvious mechanism by which tariffs might enable protected firms to lower their costs – namely, allowing these firms to take advantage of greater economies of scale. He will, I hope, forgive me for assuming that he had this mechanism in mind.

Second, Mr. Dougherty mysteriously supposes that firms will work harder to discover lower-cost means of production when government weakens the competitive pressures that spur them to do so. In his imaginary world, firms obliged by global competition to sell at low prices will exert little effort to discover how to lower their production costs, but firms will intensify their efforts to discover lower-cost means of production when protected from foreign competition – and, hence, able to sell at higher prices. As I say, one can imagine this outcome. But it’s as plausible as a student’s plea to me that he would study harder only if I were to guarantee that I’ll not assign to him a grade lower than A-minus.

Hayek’s insight is that competition is a discovery procedure precisely because no one can know in advance which methods of production, which industries, or which patterns of specialization will prove most economical. Tariffs obstruct this discovery process by artificially favoring some producers at the expense of others.

Third, judging from the tenor and context of his remarks, Mr. Dougherty’s case for tariffs – like Trump’s – is that these levies enrich Americans generally. Therefore, it was perfectly justifiable for John Puri, and me, to challenge Mr. Dougherty’s implication that tariffs are a sound means of improving the overall performance of the American economy. For Mr. Dougherty to retreat to the position that all that he was arguing is that it’s possible for tariffs to cause protected industries to lower their costs and prices, without any implication for the broader economy, is illegitimate.

Finally, like most protectionists, Mr. Dougherty flavors his protectionism with claims about national security. National security is a legitimate concern. But in this context it’s a red herring. If national security is the justification for tariffs, then the case for these tariffs must rest on their contribution to national security, not on speculation that they will lower production costs and prices.

Sincerely,
Donald J. Boudreaux
Professor of Economics
and
Martha and Nelson Getchell Chair for the Study of Free Market Capitalism at the Mercatus Center
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA 22030

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Should We Tax Goods Imported from the Past?

Here’s another letter to my long-time protectionist foe.

Mr. McKinney:

You’re unhappy with my Facebook criticism of Trump’s ridiculous assertion that the so-called ‘U.S. trade deficit’ with Canada means that Americans are financing Canadians’ consumption. Specifically, you reject my point that, if Canadians were to create a U.S. trade deficit with Canada by giving us, as gifts, billions of dollars of automobiles, aluminum, whiskey, and other goods, that the result would be Canadians paying for our consumption rather than, as Trump believes, Americans paying for Canadians’ consumption.

You conclude that I “neglect the businesses and jobs like the ones in car production destroyed by such ‘gifts’…. Such ‘gifts’ are a trojan horse to weaken our economy while Canada’s is bolstered.”

I can’t fathom how Canadians would enrich themselves and weaken us by spending their own labor and other resources to produce things, not for their consumption, but for our consumption. If your protectionist logic is correct, antebellum slavery enriched the slaves as it weakened plantation owners (with, amazingly, the plantation owners never realizing the terrible economic trickery inflicted on them by their slaves).

But if your (il)logic is correct, your embrace of protectionism is far too lame. You should, in addition to supporting tariffs on cars imported from abroad, also support tariffs on cars imported from the past. After all, Americans’ ready access to cars imported from the past reduces Americans’ demand for new cars no less than does Americans’ ready access to cars imported from abroad

So how about an escalating tax on cars as they age? For example, owners of one-year-old cars are taxed $1,000; owners of two-year-old cars are taxed $2,000; owners of three-year-old cars are taxed $4,000; and so on. These taxes would be tariffs on cars imported from the past. They would penalize those Americans who unpatriotically refuse to support the U.S. auto industry. Or as Oren Cass might put it, these tariffs on cars imported from the past would internalize on Americans who drive older vehicles the costs they thoughtlessly impose on the U.S. auto industry and its workers.

Would you approve of taxing cars imported from the past? If not, why do you approve of taxing cars and other goods imported from abroad? You’ll insist that there’s an economic difference between importing goods from abroad and importing goods from the past, but I challenge you to identify any such difference that is economically relevant. I’m all ears.’

Sincerely,
Don

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Some Links

Johan Norberg, using the example of his native Sweden, warns Americans of the dangers of MAGA-DSA socialism. A slice:

Sweden established the Swedish Investment Bank in 1967 to channel long-term finance to industry and in 1970 it founded the state holding company Statsföretag (Swedish State Company), which brought 22 companies under a single umbrella to coordinate and expand government ownership.

Soon, what first seemed like a strength—that state ownership could achieve many goals simultaneously—became a corporate governance nightmare. Boards and management fought over whether profitability or industrial policy should take precedence, making both strategic decisions and accountability difficult.

State ownership also turned government into both umpire and player: the same politicians who regulated industries and distributed subsidies now had a financial interest in the success of particular companies.

Some companies used government resources and guarantees for activities that seem distant from core state responsibilities. A state-owned restaurant group sent two employees to work for McDonald’s in the United States on a fact-finding mission. Armed with this know-how, they later started Clock, a rare example of a government-run hamburger chain, including the distinctly Swedish “Hawaii burger,” topped with pineapple.

At one point, the Swedish Investment Bank led a consortium trying to salvage the Spanish galleon San José, which had sunk off the Colombian coast in 1708 with a treasure of gold believed to be worth billions. The consortium fell apart, and the San José remains on the ocean floor.

Industrial policy gradually became an ad hoc system for rescuing failing companies. Instead of creating new industries, the government increasingly bailed out shipyards, steel companies and textile firms under pressure from trade unions and local politicians. The rescue operation became known as the “Industrial Emergency Room.”

Between 1976 and 1982, the Statsföretag group accumulated total losses of around $2 billion in today’s money, a huge sum for a small economy. Shipyard bailouts had cost the equivalent of $17 billion.

Kjell-Olof Feldt, minister of finance in the Social Democratic government that took over in 1982, described state-owned companies as “a black hole” in the public finances. A spokesman for the biggest center-right party observed: “State ownership of business has, with few exceptions, been a gigantic failure.”

Assar Lindbeck, the Social Democratic economist who first proposed creating the investment bank, came to regret his advice, noting, “I have never heard any informed observer argue that the Investment Bank served any useful purpose during its existence.”

Remarkably, less than 15 years after the new policy had been launched, a consensus had emerged that it had been a costly failure. In the 1980s and 1990s, loss-making companies were closed down and many state-owned companies were sold. One study showed that productivity in companies increased after privatization by between 12 and 36 percent.

GMU Econ alum Dave Hebert reflects on the 2026 Nobel laureates in economics. A slice:

The last implication of this year’s prize that I’ll go over is that credibility matters. A government that announces that they’re going to do something in the future affects people’s behavior today. The government then faces a choice: they can do that thing, in which case it will show that they are credible but it will have very little macroeconomic effect, or they can do something different, which will produce a short-run jolt but will strain their credibility going forward.

Few areas of policy illustrate this better than trade over the last two years. Since January of 2025, tariffs have been announced, threatened, paused, raised, delayed, and cut at a pace that can only be described as “frantic.” As a result, America’s credibility has been strained on the world stage, making it harder to secure any form of trade deal. When people do not believe what the government is saying, that uncertainty itself has a deterrent effect on economic activity. If there is one thing that we have learned, it’s that long-term growth requires long-term plans and long-term plans require credibility.

Mani Basharzad and Bryan Cheang tell “what this year’s Nobel Prize in Economics should teach policymakers about the limits of their power.”

Alan Charles Raul ponders the fraying of the rule of law in the United States. A slice:

The rule of law has mostly held. In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court declared that in “a government of laws, and not of men,” it is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” In Youngstown, the Court stopped President Harry Truman from seizing the steel mills, even in wartime and notwithstanding the national security context. Justice Robert Jackson’s concurrence anticipated precisely the present weakness in our constitutional governance where a president would dispense with the constraints of law and separated powers: “Congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence,” Jackson wrote, would “enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.” Jackson’s essential lesson was that history has discovered “no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law.”

America now confronts a challenge to that technique. In Donald Trump, we have a president who will not agree to be governed by quaint theories of checks and balances, at least so long as Congress can fairly be described as inert, indifferent, and quiescent. Madison believed that an ongoing contest of wills between ambitious legislators and chief executives would keep arbitrary power in check: “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.” He would be astonished by today’s legislative capitulation.

But the Convention also framed the presidency with George Washington before its eyes — a president who pledged to a foundation for government predicated on “the pure and immutable principles of private morality,” by which he meant virtue, honesty, and respect for what the Declaration invoked as the “Laws of Nature and Nature’s God.” Our Framers never could have expected a president to profess to be restrained “only by my own morality,” rather than by law and fiduciary duty to the public. That is not the hallmark of a constitutional presidency; it is instead a Prince’s creed.

On the legal front, the current-day news is mixed. On emergency tariff powers, the Supreme Court deferred to Congress and reined in the president. On birthright citizenship, the justices sided with the plain words of the Fourteenth Amendment over the president’s intransigent ones. And in the Census and Federal Reserve cases, the chief justice called out presidential “pretexts,” reminding judges that they are “not required to exhibit a naivete from which ordinary citizens are free.” Put less euphemistically, this means that many judges, and some justices, believe the present government is routinely lying to them.

Overall, though, the Court has catered to untrammeled presidential power by summarily reversing scores of lower-court rulings on its “shadow” docket, often without explanation. But the unmitigated apogee of undue deference to the presidency came in Trump v. United States. There, the Court’s majority invented a nearly absolute presidential immunity from federal criminal law and did so in a case concerning the efforts of a president qua candidate to overturn an election by hook or by crook. Unless we can find a way to fix this, America can no longer claim that no man is above the law.

Citing a Financial Times report, Doug Irwin tweets: (HT Scott Lincicome)

Some people thought protectionism would be a political winner. 🤔

Republicans turn on Donald Trump’s tariffs in battle for ‘political survival’

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Quotation of the Day…

… is from page 8 of Stephanie Slade’s brilliant new (2026) book, Fusionism: Liberty, Virtue, and the Future of the American Right:

Fusionists, following Hayek, have a moderate to strong inclination toward pluralism: They think that, absent serious rights violations, the state should have a hands-off posture toward private associations. Meanwhile, woke progressivism, which attempts to impose strict egalitarian values on all human associations, is a form of rationalism taken to such an extreme that many of its liberal qualities fall away.

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Protectionists Continue to Slay Straw Men

Here’s a letter to a new correspondent.

Mr. Wynn:

Thanks for sharing this tweet by Social-Identity-Thief. The point that Mr. Thief seems to make – one that you expressly endorse – is that, because all taxes raise some prices, my pointing out that tariffs raise some prices does not undermine the case for protectionism. “The case for tariffs,” you conclude, “remains a powerful one.”

Well.

My response (in support of John Puri, who got this discussion rolling) was to Michael Brendan Dougherty’s argument that tariffs, in the long run, lower prices. Mr. Dougherty writes in the centuries-old protectionist tradition that holds that obstructing fellow citizens’ access to goods and services that are produced abroad miraculously increases those citizens’ overall access to goods and services – that is, makes goods and services in the home country more abundant and, hence, available at lower prices.

You and the tweeting Mr. Thief overlook the context of the discussion. But let me make one more point.

Of course all taxes raise some prices. But it’s wrong to leap from this trivially true fact to the conclusion that “the case for tariffs remains a powerful one.” The best economic case for taxes is that they’re necessary to pay for “public goods” – goods that cannot practically be supplied by private market actors. Taking account of notions of fairness and of economic efficiency, economists have spilled oceans of ink exploring how best to levy such taxes. Although legitimate disagreement on this front continues among economists, all serious participants in these scholarly discussions acknowledge that every tax regime will cause the prices of some things to rise relative to those of other things.

As for the case for relying on tariffs as a source of revenue, it’s weak – as explained by (among others) Brian Albrecht.

To repeat my main point: The dominant economic case for protectionism – including the thrust of the Trump-MAGA case – is that tariffs supposedly create a greater abundance of goods and services in the domestic economy and thereby reduce all prices. The dominant economic case against protectionism, then, is to expose the many fallacies that motivate this protectionist case. So contrary to what you and Mr. Thief believe, you have not caught me in a “Gotcha!” by noting a fact that neither I nor any other proponent of free trade has ever denied, namely, that all taxes cause some prices to rise.

Sincerely,
Donald J. Boudreaux
Professor of Economics
and
Martha and Nelson Getchell Chair for the Study of Free Market Capitalism at the Mercatus Center
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA 22030

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Some Links

The Editorial Board of the Wall Street Journal justly criticizes Jane Fonda and other ‘progressives’ for opposing a California initiative that would ease Californians’ ability to build and produce. A slice:

The progressive “abundance” movement is getting an election test in California, where the climate lobby and unions have come out swinging against Prop. 45, a ballot initiative that would accelerate permitting for housing, green energy and public works. Here is a snapshot of why life in California is so expensive.

The 1970 California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) is the bane of businesses and anyone who wants to build in the state. Localities often take years to complete environmental reviews for small projects, which are then subject to lengthy public comment and hearings. Opponents weaponize the law to delay or kill projects.

Homeowners challenge environmental reviews for nearby housing projects they fear could hurt their property values or increase traffic. Building unions threaten litigation to block projects if developers don’t accept prevailing wage mandates. The green left opposes water storage and energy projects, and most everything else.

A gas station owner last decade sued to block a competing gas station across the street from adding several new pumps. Even progressive favorites like bike lanes, food banks and solar farms are ensnared by CEQA. The result: A shortage of housing, water and energy—and inevitably higher prices.

Enter Prop. 45, which would expedite permitting for, and limit litigation against, “essential” projects, including housing, transportation, water, broadband, renewable energy, schools, healthcare facilities and wildfire mitigation. Local governments would have to specify all information that developers must submit at the outset of environmental reviews. That means bureaucrats couldn’t change review standards mid-review. Opponents would have 45 days to submit public comments on draft environmental impact statements.

If a project is approved, opponents would have 30 days to file a lawsuit. Judicial review would be limited to “whether the approval or authorization complies with objective existing laws.” Courts would have 270 days to rule. If judges find fault with a particular aspect of an environmental review, they couldn’t block the projects en toto.

The California Building Industry Association estimates Prop. 45 would decrease the cost of building a new home by $75,000 on average. It would likewise reduce costs for critical infrastructure projects, saving taxpayers billions of dollars and potentially lowering utility bills. Another bonus: Less gridlock on jammed roads.

Wall Street Journal columnist Joseph Sternberg warns of the ill-consequences for Americans of heeding the advice of certain French economists who have no understanding of how actual wealth is created. A slice:

As dangerous is the attitude Proposition 40 embodies. Its premise is that any and all private wealth constitutes an illegitimate diversion of resources away from the state. Despite the initial application to fortunes only above $1 billion, one discerns in the academic literature behind Proposition 40 no limiting principle.

This is foreign to America’s political tradition, in which property rights are a foundation of our liberty. The tax is entirely redistributive and punitive, and in this regard its philosophical radicalness is underappreciated. Probably because the danger it poses to the economy is so distracting.

That’s where the French come in. It’s notable that the key academic advocates of Proposition 40, and wealth taxes in general, are French. Emmanuel Saez, an economist who teaches at University of California, Berkeley, is credited as one of the authors of Proposition 40. His frequent collaborator Gabriel Zucman is a vocal proponent. Between them they have done more than any other economists to provide an intellectual veneer to the case for introducing wealth taxes in America.

Messrs. Saez and Zucman derive their conclusions from Thomas Piketty, also French, whose 2014 book, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century,” revived academic and popular interest in inequality. Mr. Piketty’s political influence has proved more durable than his book’s methodological credibility, and debate still rages about whether any of these people can accurately measure “wealth” at all.

This isn’t a knock on the French, who can be lovely people when they aren’t rioting. But the French origins of Proposition 40 are significant. For one, these economists come from a political-economy tradition very different from America’s.

More to the point, they come from a country that is broke. France has just wrapped up another week of rioting over its government’s lack of money. This time students are demanding more cash for schools. At various other times it was government employees, retirees and farmers. With a nearly 120% ratio of government debt to gross domestic product and fiscal deficits above 5% of GDP each year, there’s no money to give them.

This has encouraged the spread of the convenient fantasy that France—and, by extension, Europe’s other bankrupt states—would have enough money to spend if only the wealthy could be forced to pay their fair share of taxes. Most of the global tax debate of the past decade traces back to this myth.

The problem is that France already tried a wealth tax of its own. It was a flop. The levy consistently generated less revenue than predicted, and President Emmanuel Macron scrapped it in 2018. French economists managed to avoid learning anything about incentives, prosperity or fiscal sustainability from this experience. But they do think they know how to make a wealth tax work better.

Paul McDonnold tells of how the American south is enriched by free enterprise.

Here’s the abstract of a new paper by Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, Réka Juhász, Giulia Lo Forte, and Jeff Thurk:

We show that cross-border learning is an important feature of modern semiconductor manufacturing and that several important channels – such as knowledge sharing along global supply chains, the movement of engineers within multinational firms, and foreign direct investment – operate through market mechanisms rather than anonymous technological spillovers. These findings have significant policy implications. When cross-border learning is mediated by purposeful economic relationships, access to frontier knowledge is neither automatic nor guaranteed. Firms and governments can facilitate – or restrict – the international diffusion of technology, implying that policies to foster domestic technological upgrading are likely to be most effective when coupled with continued access to global sources of frontier knowledge.

“US steel prices climb to four-year high as Trump’s tariffs bite.” (HT Scott Lincicome)

James Pethokoukis is optimistic about America.

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Quotation of the Day…

… is from page 65 of the late Anthony de Jasay‘s brilliant 1997 volume, Against Politics:

Much of the old confusion we deplore in political theory, and much of the fresh confusion we spread when trying to get rid of what has been spread, springs from false notions of what rationality is and what it does.

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