When the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative unveiled its now-infamous “Liberation Day” tariff formula in April 2025, economists quickly noticed that something was not right.
At first glance, the formula looked impressive. It had Greek symbols, academic citations, and all the trappings of serious economic analysis. But once economists began examining it, the sophistication quickly fell away. Key terms, they noticed, effectively cancel one another out, leaving little more than a calculation driven by bilateral trade deficits.
For one of us, an economist, that raised a simple question: How did this formula come to be? So he filed a Freedom of Information Act request seeking the records behind it. Then came more than a year of delays, missed deadlines, and back-and-forth with the U.S. Trade Representative.
When the agency finally responded, it said it had found 31 pages of responsive records. It would release none of them — not one email, calculation or even redacted paragraph. Rather, the office insisted that every page is protected because the records include communications between the agency and the White House Council of Economic Advisers about the reciprocal tariff calculations.
Whether those privileges ultimately apply is a question for the courts. But they do not answer the larger question. From an economist’s perspective, the response raises an obvious question: If the economic case for these tariffs was so strong, why is the government so determined to hide its work? And why wouldn’t the Council of Economic Advisers, a body of academic experts, put its name on a document that it reportedly helped to prepare?
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If professional economists inside the council warned that the formula made little sense, the public deserves to know. If they endorsed it, the public deserves to know that, too. What should not happen is for the entire record to disappear behind a blanket claim of executive privilege.
The administration’s handling of one of its own academic sources only deepens the mystery. One of the main academic sources cited in support of the formula was a then-obscure working paper by economists Pau Pujolas and Jack Rossbach. Just days later, a link to the same paper appeared again in a speech by then-chairman Stephen Miran, defending the “Liberation Day” tariffs.
But one of the paper’s authors later said the administration had misused their research to support the opposite of what the paper actually found. As Pujolas explained, “there’s a huge gap between my study and what they’re doing.”
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Reasonable people disagree about tariffs, trade deficits, and industrial policy. But the executive branch owes the public an honest explanation for policies that affect hundreds of billions of dollars in commerce.
When the government asks courts to defer to its judgment, businesses to trust its reasoning, and the public to accept sweeping economic policies, it should be willing to show its work. What is this administration afraid we will see?
Scott Lincicome writes that manufacturing in the U.S. is thriving despite tariffs. Two slices:
The U.S. manufacturing sector’s recent growth is real but has been exaggerated in recent surveys. More importantly, the hard data we now have show that the nation’s industrial upswing is being driven by non-tariff forces—ones that have more than offset a clear tariff headwind. In fact, American factories would likely be doing even better without the tariffs, an inconvenient reality that brand new research confirms. Let’s dig in.
The first problem with the protectionists’ spin is wonky but important: Much of the recent tariff triumphalism rests on PMI surveys that are useful for gauging short-term industry sentiment and forecasting future trends but can misrepresent what’s happening nationwide and over the long term. As economist Dave Hebert just detailed, the PMI records the share of purchasing managers in various U.S. manufacturing industries who report an increase, decrease, or no change in their orders, employment, prices, and other categories of business activity. The index documents only the direction of the change, not its magnitude. Thus, Hebert explains, a big company like Ford could lay off 1,000 workers while two other small automotive firms each hire five, and the index would read 66.7, signaling a robust “expansion” even though actual employment fell by 990.
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Despite these problems, real-world data do show an uptick in the U.S. manufacturing sector, especially in 2026. According to the Federal Reserve’s industrial production index, domestic manufacturing output has been on a decent run since Trump took office, outside of that multimonth dip in the second half of last year.
That’s good news for the sector, but there’s little reason to think it’s owed to Trump’s tariffs. More likely, the growth is happening despite them.
For starters, three powerful factors coincided with the 2025-26 tariffs and are the most likely drivers of U.S. factory output. On the supply side, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act restored and made permanent provisions that allow U.S. businesses to immediately deduct spending on equipment, machinery, and research and development (R&D), and the law temporarily allowed U.S. manufacturers to do the same for spending on structures, effective January 2026. As the Tax Foundation explains at the link above, research shows that cutting the after-tax cost of these business inputs boosts investment and growth, and they estimate that the OBBBA’s permanent expensing provisions will boost long-run GDP by a significant amount (0.7 percent). As I and others have explained for years now, these neutral, free-market reforms are particularly beneficial for large, capital-intensive manufacturers, and their timing aligns with the current U.S. manufacturing acceleration. (The temporary expensing provisions might induce a sugar high but won’t affect long-run growth; they should instead be made permanent.) The White House, for what it’s worth, seems to agree: Its official press release credits business tax cuts, not tariffs, for the current manufacturing “boom.”
Miles Saltiel explains why markets are essential to growth.
In California, Representative Ro Khanna is determined to tax the state’s billionaires, the consequences be damned. In New York City, Mayor Zohran Mamdani is fixated upon the establishment of government-run grocery stores, even as the absurdity of his plan becomes clearer by the week. Both men are impervious to reason. Objections are dismissed, criticisms are deliquesced, contemplation is a skill not yet learned.
Informed that a series of government-run grocery stores would be a burden to the taxpayer, Mamdani merely pounded the Exchequer. Told that this policy might have a deleterious effect on the city’s existing outlets, an aide glibly proposed a subsidy. That subsidy, in turn, will have consequences, and, when those consequences are adumbrated, yet another mitigation will undoubtedly be contrived on the fly. Rube Goldberg, please call your office.
Ro Khanna’s penchant for instantaneous patchwork is more alarming still. Upon hearing that his coveted wealth tax does not intersect with reality, Khanna spontaneously invented an invasive new program: “Allow illiquid founders to pledge shares with a loan from the government to pay tax,” he wrote on X. “The loan period is long but not infinite (e.g. 10 years). The loan is non-resource: at the end of the period, the loan is either paid back in cash, or the government assumes the shares.” That, as it happens, is a preposterous idea. But the instinct is more instructive than the detail. Khanna has his agenda, and he is trying to bend the world around it. Welcome back, Mr. Caligula, we trust you will enjoy your stay.
There is a delicious irony to all of this. Wealth-tax advocates complain about wealthy people borrowing against appreciated stock rather than selling the stock and realizing the gains that trigger capital gains taxes. Yet when their wealth tax creates a liquidity problem, their solution is for billionaires to borrow against appreciated stock, only now from Uncle Sam.
Cuban identified an even deeper problem: The new company doesn’t have to fail for this arrangement to become perverse. A founder could spend the next 10 years building an enormously successful company, creating thousands of jobs, and paying millions in taxes, while continuing to reinvest rather than cash out. After a decade, his shares might be worth far more than when the loan was made—and he still might not have $100 million in cash to repay the wealth-tax loan.
The reason is that success and liquidity are not the same thing. In Khanna’s government-loan scenario, the government could sell the shares used as collateral not because the company failed but because the founder kept his wealth tied up in the venture. Under this system, the incentive is to cash out instead of growing the business, hiring more people, and creating more corporate tax revenue over the long term.
[Mark] Cuban’s response was profane but insightful: “This is the biggest fuck you in the history of entrepreneurship.” While Khanna points to founders so rich that this situation might not be much of a problem now, they made their business decisions and took lots of financial risks when they weren’t threatened by a wealth tax.
Before Republicans get too indignant, they should look in the mirror. The Trump administration helped destroy the norm against government ownership of American businesses by taking a nearly 10 percent stake in Intel and pieces of many other companies, including Trilogy Metals and USA Rare Earth.
But there’s nothing modest about the measure—championed by the SEIU-United Healthcare Workers West—to confiscate wealth from California’s top job creators.
The tax will punish private startup founders whose assets mostly consist of illiquid shares in their companies. They may lack cash and liquid assets to pay the tax bill. What are they supposed to do? The initiative would let them spread the payment over five years, though at a hefty interest charge.
They would also be allowed to defer payment until they are able to monetize their startup stake. As the Tax Foundation explains, the state would then become “a co-investor in the assets.” If they appreciate over time, “California can tax the additional accumulated wealth even if the taxpayer has long since left the state.” Neither option is appealing.
Last weekend on social media Mr. Khanna floated another idea. “Allow illiquid founders to pledge shares with a loan from the government to pay tax,” he wrote. “The loan period is long but not infinite (e.g. 10 years)” and “at the end of the period, the loan is either paid back in cash, or the government assumes the shares.”
“The government would make out if the company succeeds in terms of collection but founders would not be personally liable if the company somehow failed,” he wrote. The latter isn’t true, as others quickly corrected. Hedge fund manager Bill Ackman wrote that a founder could still owe tax if he takes out a loan against his shares from the state and if the company fails.
Mr. Khanna later acknowledged as much. “If the shares go to zero the founder can still face capital gains tax on the deemed sale (basis is often near zero),” he said. “That’s a real issue.” Yes, it is.
A more obvious problem: The state would be lending money to billionaires to pay itself. As Mark Cuban mused, if the state doesn’t receive any incremental revenue, “what’s the point of that?” Also, what happens if a founder can’t pay back the loan in 10 years? The government could then seize the shares.
“I’m sure the investors in those companies will be thrilled about their new partners,” Mr. Cuban wryly noted. His point is that the prospect of government taking partial ownership and control of a startup would chill venture investment.
Palmer Luckey, who co-founded the defense tech startup Anduril Industries, shrewdly noted founders would have a 10-year “speedrun” to pay back their loans—or else surrender their shares to the government—which could warp a business’s incentive to create long-term value for investors. “The behavioral incentives are so obviously horrible,” he wrote.
I seldom agree with Donald Trump, but on this matter he’s correct (as reported by the Editorial Board of the Washington Post): The the data-center industry needs “a little public relations help.” A slice from the Post‘s editorial:
That even Loudoun County residents are starting to complain about the bargain they’ve struck speaks to Trump’s point about a PR problem. Opposition to data centers also reflects broader anxieties, and it would help if AI leaders stopped talking nonsense about how their inventions will imminently replace workers — nonsense that appeals to a certain kind of investor but terrifies the public.
Progress on artificial intelligence won’t make humans obsolete, but it can make them wealthier and more productive. Data centers need a better plan for negotiating with local governments, but the frothy debate about the economics of AI also needs a reality check.


The first problem with collective action determined by majority rule is that those in the minority must accept the outcome preferred by the majority. If a group is voting on whether to drink Coke or Pepsi, if a majority votes for Coke, then those who prefer Pepsi get Coke. If the decision were left to the market, those who want Pepsi get Pepsi, those who want Dr Pepper get Dr Pepper, and those who want 7UP get 7UP. If a democratic government is deciding on the characteristics of public schools, the preferences of the majority are imposed on the minority. In a market system that produced schools in the private sector, there is no reason to think that the variety of schools would be any less great than the variety of soft drinks the market produces, allowing those in the minority to have their preferences satisfied too.
Perhaps the scariest aspect of our times is how many people think in talking points, rather than in terms of real world consequences.
Indeed, few developing nations have grown rapidly over time without simultaneous increases in both exports and imports, and virtually all developing countries that have grown rapidly have done so under open trade policies or declining trade protection.
Nations trade with each other because they benefit from it. Other motives may be involved, of course, but the basic economic motivation for international trade is that of gain. The gain from international trade, like the gain from all trade, exists because specialization increases productivity. We are familiar with fruits of specialization and the division of labor in trade between regions of a single country, or between persons in a town, but we may not perceive that the same benefits exist in international trade. The political boundaries that divide geographic areas into nations do not change the fundamental nature of trade and the benefits it confers on the trading partners.
The social function of economic science consists precisely in developing sound economic theories and in exploding the fallacies of vicious reasoning. In the pursuit of this task the economist incurs the deadly enmity of all mountebanks and charlatans whose shortcuts to an earthly paradise he debunks. The less these quacks are able to advance plausible objections to an economist’s argument, the more furiously do they insult them.
